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Abstract
The standard view of classical cognitive science stated that cognition 
consists  in  the  manipulation  of  language-like  structures  according  to 
formal rules. Since cognition is 'linguistic' in itself, according to this view 
language is just a complex communication system and does not influence 
cognitive processes in any substantial way. This view has been criticized 
from several perspectives and a new framework (Embodied Cognition) 
has  emerged  that  considers  cognitive  processes  as  non-symbolic  and 
heavily dependent on the dynamical interactions between the cognitive 
system and its  environment.  But  notwithstanding  the  successes  of  the 
Embodied Cognitive Science in explaining low-level cognitive behaviors, 
it is still not clear whether and how it can scale up for explaining high-
level  cognition.  In  this  paper  we  argue  that  this  can  be  done  by 
considering the role of language as a cognitive tool: i.e. how language 
transforms basic cognitive functions in the high-level functions that are 
characteristic of human cognition. In order to do that, we review some 
computational  models  that  substantiate  this  view  with  respect  to 
categorization  and  memory.  Since  these  models  are  based  on  a  very 
rudimentary form of non-syntactic  'language'  we argue that  the use of 
language  as  a  cognitive  tool  might  have  been  an  early  discovery  in 
hominid  evolution,  and  might  have  played  a  substantial  role  in  the 
evolution of language itself.
Keywords: language; cognitive tool; computational model; language 
evolution; embodied cognition; high-level cognition
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1. Language and cognition: the ‘received’ view and its critics
What is the role of language in human cognition? This is one of the most 
important  questions  we have to  address  if  we want  to  understand the 
human mind.  The standard view of  classical  cognitive  science can be 
summarized  with two statements:  (a)  cognition is,  generally speaking, 
'linguistic'  in  itself,  in  that  it  is  the  manipulation  of  language-like 
structures (propositions)  according to formal  rules;  (b)  the  function of 
natural  language  is  just  to  express  these  language-like  structures; 
therefore, natural language does not affect cognition in any substantial 
way.
The view of cognition as symbol manipulation is at the very heart of 
classical  cognitive  science,  constituting  the  common  assumption  of  at 
least  three  of  the  sub-disciplines  that  gave  birth  to  cognitive  science: 
artificial intelligence (the symbol system hypothesis; Newell and Simon, 
1976), cognitive psychology (the language of thought hypothesis; Fodor, 
1975),  and  cognitive-science-related  philosophy  of  mind  (i.e. 
computationalism; Putnam, 1963).
 If one considers cognition as fundamentally linguistic, then there is 
no reason for viewing language as anything more than a very complex 
and powerful communication system. And, in fact, this view of language 
has been seldom if ever questioned inside traditional cognitive science. 
The basic assumptions of classical cognitive science, however, have 
been questioned over the years from several perspectives. For example, a 
number  of  philosophical  arguments  have been put  forward against  the 
view of cognition as symbol  manipulation (see,  for  example,  Dreyfus, 
1972; Dennett, 1978; Searle, 1980; Churchland, 1981). But in the absence 
of concrete alternative proposals advocates of the view of cognition as 
symbol manipulation could still claim that their hypothesis was "the only 
game in town" (Fodor, 1975).
In  the  last  twenty  years  a  number  of  such  alternatives  have  been 
proposed. The first one was connectionism: in their famous 1986 book, 
Rumelhart,  McClelland,  and  the  PDP  group  (Rumelhart  et  al.,  1986) 
provided  a  concrete  and  detailed  account  of  cognition  which  was 
completely alternative to the symbol manipulation paradigm. According 
to  this  alternative  view cognition  is  not  the  manipulation  of  symbols 
according to formal rules, but rather the parallel and distribute processing 
of  sub-symbolic  information,  that  is,  the  transformation  of  purely 
quantitative  values (the  pattern of  activation of  groups of  units)  using 
other quantitative values (the connection weights linking groups of units) 
in networks of neuron-like units.
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Other fundamental  attacks  to  the  classical  view  of  cognition  as 
symbol  manipulation  came  in  the  early  1990s  from  behaviour-based 
robotics  and  Artificial  Life  (Brooks,  1990;  Parisi  et  al.,  1990).  The 
‘Artificial Life route to Artificial Intelligence’ (Steels and Brooks 1994) 
pointed  to  the  fact  that  cognitive  processes  are  always  'embodied', 
'situated' and (partially) 'distributed' in an organism's environment. They 
are embodied in that the body and its physical properties are important 
determinants of the way a given task is solved. They are situated because 
the constrains provided by the environment can act also as opportunities 
for the task's solution. And they are partially distributed because they do 
not happen only inside an organism’s head; rather, they crucially depend 
on  the  organism’s  environment  which,  especially  in  the  human  case, 
includes artefacts and other agents. (For a view of connectionism as part 
of  Artificial  Life,  in  which  neural  networks  control  the  behaviour  of 
embodied and situated agents see Parisi, 2001).
Finally, another challenge to the symbolic approach to cognition came 
from dynamical systems theory. Proponents of the dynamical hypothesis 
argue that cognition should not be accounted for in computational terms, 
but rather using differential  equations and dynamical  systems concepts 
such as equilibrium points, cyclic behaviour, attractors, and bifurcations. 
More  specifically,  cognition  must  be  understood  by  interpreting  a 
cognitive  system  as  a  point  moving  in  an  abstract  multi-dimensional 
space, and by identifying the trajectories that the system follows in that 
space  and  the  laws  that  govern  these  trajectories  (Smith  and  Thelen, 
1993; Port and van Gelder, 1995; van Gelder, 1998; Beer, 2000).
The  concepts  and  tools  of  connectionism,  robotics,  and  dynamical 
systems theory opened up several very active areas of research, especially 
of the synthetic kind. The overall result is that contemporary cognitive 
science is substantially rethinking its view of cognition. In particular, the 
fundamental assumption of classical cognitive science that cognition is 
the manipulation of symbols according to formal rules is being replaced 
by a view according to which the mechanisms that explain behaviour are 
non-symbolic or sub-symbolic, and cognition consists in the adaptation of 
an  agent  to  its  environment.  Furthermore,  this  adaptation  critically 
depends  on  the  dynamic  interactions  between  the  agent  and  the 
environment, which can also include artefacts and other agents (Bechtel 
et al., 1998; Clark, 2001).
But apart from ‘classical’ connectionism, which addresses all levels of 
cognition but without taking into account 'embodiment' and 'situatedness', 
the  new  cognitive  science  has  been  so  far  concerned  mostly,  if  not 
exclusively, with low-level behaviors and capacities, such as perception, 
learning,  sensory-motor  coordination,  and  navigation.  The  question 
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remains open whether the same broad framework can scale up to explain 
the higher forms of cognition which characterize human beings (such as 
problem  solving,  reasoning,  and  planning),  or  if  in  order  to  explain 
characteristic  human  cognition  we  must  go  back  to  the  symbol 
manipulation  paradigm.  From the point  of  view of  the  new cognitive 
science the most promising way of addressing this question, we argue, is 
to consider language not only as a communication system but also as a 
cognitive tool. 
2. Language as a cognitive tool
The view of language as something that transforms all human cognitive 
processes dates back as early as the 1930s,  with the work of Russian 
scholar Lev Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 1962; Vygotsky, 1978). According to 
Vygotsky,  the most  important  moment  in child development is  that  in 
which  the  child  begins  to  use  language  not  only  as  a  social 
communication system but also as a tool for controlling her own actions 
and cognitive processes. When the child is challenged by a particularly 
difficult task she is often given help by an adult or a more skilled peer, 
and this help typically takes a linguistic form. Later on, when the child is 
facing the same or a similar task all alone, she can rehearse the social 
linguistic aid which helped her to succeed in the problem. This is called 
'private speech', which, according to Vygotsky, plays a fundamental role 
in the development of all human psychological processes. 
The  linguistic  social  aid  coming  from  adults  takes  several  forms. 
Social language helps a child to learn how to categorize experiences, to 
focus her attention on important aspects of the environment, to remember 
useful information, to inhibit non-useful behavior, to divide challenging 
problems  into  easier  sub-problems  and  hence  to  construct  a  plan  for 
solving complex tasks, and so on. When the child is talking to herself she 
is just making to herself what others used to do to her, that is, providing 
all sorts of cognitive aid through linguistic utterances. Once the child has 
mastered this linguistic self-aid,  private speech tends to disappear,  but 
only if one looks at the child from outside. In fact, it is only abbreviated 
and internalized, becoming inner speech. Hence, most, if not all, of adult 
human  cognitive  processes  are  linguistically  mediated,  in  that  they 
depend on the use of language for oneself.
Recently,  the  idea of  language  as  a  cognitive  tool  has  been given 
increasing attention within the cognitive-science-oriented philosophy of 
mind  (Carruthers  and  Boucher,  1998).  For  example,  Daniel  Dennett 
(Dennett, 1991; Dennett, 1993; Dennett, 1995) has argued that the human 
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mind, including  its most striking and hard to explain property, namely 
consciousness, depends mostly not on innate cognitive abilities, but on 
the  way  human  plastic  brains  are  substantially  're-programmed'  by 
cultural input coming, principally, through language: "Conscious human 
minds are more-or-less serial virtual machines implemented -inefficiently 
- on the parallel hardware that evolution has provided for us" (Dennett, 
1991, p. 278).
Andy  Clark  (Clark,  1997;  Clark,  1998;  Clark,  2006)  has  further 
developed these Dennettian ideas by providing several arguments about 
how  animal-like,  embodied,  situated,  and  sub-symbolic  cognitive 
processes can be augmented by the learning and use of linguistic signs. 
According to Clark, language is not only a communication system, but 
also a kind of "external artifact whose current adaptive value is partially 
constituted by its role in re-shaping the kinds of computational space that 
our biological  brains must  negotiate in order to solve certain types  of 
problems,  or  to carry out  certain complex problems."  (Clark,  1998,  p. 
163).
Apart of the interesting philosophical ideas of Dennett and Clark, the 
Vygotskyan  view  of  language  as  a  cognitive  tool  has  recently  been 
raising increasing interest also in  empirical  cognitive science (see,  for 
example, Gentner and Goldin-Meadow, 2003). Indeed, a growing body of 
empirical  evidence  demonstrates  the importance  of  language  for  a 
number  of  cognitive  functions  including  learning  (Nazzi  &  Gopnik, 
2001),  memory (Gruber & Goschke,  2004),  analogy making (Gentner, 
2003), cross-modal information exchange (Spelke 2003), problem solving 
(Diaz & Berk,  1992),  abstract  reasoning (Thompson et al.,  1997),  and 
logico-mathematical abilities (Dehaene et al., 1999).
In our work, we explore and articulate the hypothesis of language as a 
cognitive tool by the aid of artificial life simulations which use neural 
networks  as  models  of  the  nervous  system and  genetic  algorithms  as 
models  of  evolution  by  natural  selection.  Computer  simulations  can 
provide fundamental tools in the development of new ideas and in the 
formulation  of  theories  in  that  (a)  they  force  the  theory  to  be  stated 
clearly  and  in  full  details,  (b)  they  uncontroversially  generate  the 
consequences of the assumptions of the theory as the simulation results, 
and (c) they suggest new ideas and directions of research. In what follows 
we describe some recent computational models of the use of language as 
a cognitive aid and of its role in human evolution.
3. Language and categorization
Basically,  organisms  respond  to  sensory  inputs  by  generating  motor 
outputs.  The  motor  output  which  is  generated  in  response  to  some 
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particular  sensory  input  tends  to  have  consequences  that  increase  the 
individual’s  survival/reproductive  chances.  Evolution  and  learning  are 
processes, respectively at the population and individual level, that result 
in  acquiring  the  capacity  to  respond  to  sensory  inputs  with  the 
appropriate motor outputs. We model organisms using neural networks 
and  evolution  and  learning  as  changes  in  the  networks’  connection 
weights  that  allow  the  organism  to  respond  appropriately  to  sensory 
input. 
If we look at sensory-motor mapping we see that it is not the case that 
each different sensory input requires a different motor output.  Different 
sensory inputs may require the same motor output, and different sensory 
inputs that require the same motor output are said to form ‘categories’. 
(Motor outputs can be ‘the same’ at some more abstract level than the 
level of the specific physical movements. An organism can respond to an 
object  with  the  same  action  of  ‘reaching’  for  the  object  although  in 
different  occasions  the specific physical  movements  of  the organism’s 
arm can  be  different,  for  example  as  a  function  of  the  arm’s  starting 
position.)  What  are  categories  in  terms  of  a  neural  network model  of 
behaviour? To answer this question we have to consider how a simple 
sensory-motor neural network is structured and functions.
In a neural network some particular sensory input is encoded as some 
particular activation pattern in the network’s input units. This activation 
pattern  elicits  another,  particular  activation  pattern  at  the  level  of  the 
hidden units, which in turn elicits a particular activation pattern in the 
output  units.  The  activation  pattern  appearing  in  the  output  units 
determines the particular movement with which the organism responds to 
the  sensory  input.  Neural  networks  learn  to  respond  appropriately  to 
sensory input by modifying their connection weights (either by genetic 
evolution or through individual learning) so that different sensory inputs  
that must be responded to with the same motor output will elicit similar  
activation patterns in the hidden units, and  similar sensory inputs that  
must  be responded to with different  motor outputs  will  elicit  different  
activation patterns in the hidden units. (For an Artificial Life model of 
this action-based view of categories, see Di Ferdinando and Parisi, 2004.)
We  can  consider  the  activation  pattern  observed  in  the  network’s 
hidden units at any given time as one point in an abstract hyperspace with 
as many dimensions as the number of hidden units, where the coordinate 
of  the  point  for  each  dimension  is  the  activation  level  of  the 
corresponding  unit.  Categories  are  ‘clouds’  of  points  in  this  abstract 
hyperspace, that is, sets of points elicited by sensory inputs that must be 
responded  to  with  the  same  motor  output.  Different  categories  are 
different clouds of points. Good categories are clouds of points that are 
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(a) small  (activation patterns that must  be responded to with the same 
motor output are made more similar by the connection weights linking 
the  input  units  to  the  hidden  units)  and  (b)  distant  from  each  other 
(activation  patterns  that  must  be  responded  to  with  different  motor 
outputs are made more different  by these weights).  The reason is that 
effectiveness of  the organism’s  behaviour depends on the goodness of 
these categories. With good categories the organism will be less likely to 
respond  in  different  ways  to  sensory  inputs  that  require  the  same 
response,  or  in  the  same  way to  sensory inputs  that  require  different 
responses.
What  are  the  consequences  of  the  possession  of  language  for  an 
organism’s  categories?  We  can  model  language  as  a  second sensory-
motor network which is added to the basic sensory-motor network that 
we  have  already  described  and  which  underlies  the  organism’s  non-
linguistic behaviour. We will call  the two networks the ‘sensory-motor 
network’  and  the  ‘linguistic  network’,  respectively.  Like  the  sensory-
motor network, the linguistic network has a layer of sensory input units 
connected to a layer of hidden units connected to a layer of motor output 
units.  The  sensory  units  of  the  linguistic  network  encode  linguistic 
(heard)  sound  and  the  motor  output  units  encode  phono-articulatory 
movements that produce linguistic sounds. During the first year of life of 
the  child,  the  linguistic  and  the  sensory-motor  network  are  not 
functionally (or perhaps even anatomically) connected and they are used 
separately.  The child  uses  the  sensory-motor  network to  learn to  map 
non-linguistic  sensory  inputs  from  objects  and  persons  into  the 
appropriate motor actions (e.g. reaching for, grasping, and manipulating 
objects, following another person’s gaze, turning towards another person, 
etc.)  and  uses  the  linguistic  network  to  learn  to  generate  phono-
articulatory  movements  that  result  in  sounds  corresponding  to  heard 
sounds (that is, imitating the linguistic sounds of the particular language 
spoken in its environment).
At 1 year of age proper language learning begins. The two networks 
become  functionally  connected  and  the  child  begins  to  learn  the 
appropriate  synaptic  weights  of  the  two-way  connections  linking  the 
hidden  units  of  the  sensory-motor  network to  the  hidden  units  of  the 
linguistic network. What are the appropriate synaptic weights for these 
connections?  These  are  weights  such that  a  particular  sound which is 
heard  by the  child,  i.e.,  which  is  encoded in  the  sensory units  of  the 
linguistic network, will tend to elicit an activation pattern in the hidden 
units  of  the  sensory-motor  network  which  is  similar  to  the  activation 
pattern elicited by some perceived object or action, and thus in a non-
linguistic action which is appropriate to the heard sound. This is language 
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understanding. And, conversely, a particular perceived object or action, 
which is encoded in the sensory units of the sensory-motor network, will 
tend to elicit  an activation pattern in the hidden units of the linguistic 
network that result  in some appropriate phono-articulatory movements. 
This is language production. 
What are the consequences of this reciprocal functional linking of the 
sensory-motor network and the linguistic network, i.e., of possessing a 
language,  for  the  organism’s  categories?  The  answer  is  that 
categorization is enhanced by language (Mirolli and Parisi 2005b). When 
the child hears and understands the language spoken by others, the child’s 
categories tend to become better categories, i.e., smaller and more distant 
clouds of points in the child’s neural network. If the child perceives an 
object and at the same time she hears the linguistic sound that designates 
the  object  in  the  particular  language  spoken  in  her  environment,  the 
activation pattern that results in the hidden units of the child’s sensory-
motor network depends on both the sensory input from the object and the 
sensory input  from the  linguistic  sound.  The  consequence  is  that  this 
activation pattern is  more  similar  to  the  activation  patterns  elicited in 
other occasions by other objects  belonging to  the same category (that 
must be responded to with the same action) and more dissimilar to the 
activation  patterns  elicited  by  objects  belonging  to  other  categories, 
compared with the activation pattern observed in an organism without 
language.
But this is not the whole story. An important characteristic of human 
language,  which  distinguishes  it  from the  communication  systems  of 
other animals, is that human language is used not only for communicating 
with others but also for communicating with oneself. Indeed, the use of 
language for oneself starts as soon as language is acquired, and represents 
a  significant  proportion of  the  child’s  linguistic  production.  Empirical 
studies  demonstrate  that  3  to  10  year  old  children  use  language  for 
themselves 20-60% of the time (Berk, 1994). 
As discussed above, the use of language for talking to oneself can be 
related to the ‘language as a cognitive tool’ hypothesis: private speech 
happens  as  the  child  discovers  that  she  can  exploit  the  advantages 
provided  by  language  by  talking  to  herself.  Later  on,  the  child  can 
internalize  this  linguistic  self-aid,  by  just  ‘thinking’  linguistic  labels 
without producing them out aloud. Can this interpretation of private and 
inner  speech  be  applied  to  the  advantages  produced  by  language  on 
categorization? In order to answer this question we need to model both 
ways  in  which  humans  can  talk  to  themselves:  externally,  as  private 
speech, or internally, as inner speech. 
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The  simulation  of  private  speech  is  quite  straightforward.  The 
network encounters an object and it responds to the object by producing 
the  sound  that  designates  the  object  using  its  linguistic  sub-network. 
Then,  the network hears the sound it  has just  produced and responds, 
using its sensory-motor sub-network, to the internal representation of the 
self-produced sound. Inner speech can instead be simulated as follows. 
When the network perceives an object, it does not produce any sound. 
Nonetheless,  the  sight  of  the  object  does  induce  the  internal 
representation of the name of the object in the linguistic hidden units. In 
inner speech, it is this internal representation of the label associated to the 
perceived  object  that  influences  the  non-linguistic  response  of  the 
network.
As it turns out, the advantage for the network’s categories provided 
by social language, when the network hears linguistic signals produced 
by somebody else, can be observed even if the organism is all alone and 
talks to itself. In fact, both self-produced and internally-thought linguistic 
signals  improve  sensory-motor  internal  representations  of  perceived 
objects more or less to the same extent as social linguistic input. That is, 
compared  to  the  representations  of  the  pre-linguistic  network,  internal 
representations  of  objects  belonging  to  the  same  category  are  more 
similar (close) to each other, and those of objects belonging to different 
categories  are  more  different  (distant)  to  each  other  (see  Mirolli  and 
Parisi, 2006).
4. Talking to oneself in the evolution of language
Why did language evolve? What was the adaptive function of language? 
This question is surely of the most importance, if one wants to understand 
the  evolution  of  language  and  of  man  in  general.  Nonetheless,  in  the 
contemporary literature on language evolution there is not much debate 
on this topic (see, for example, Knight et al., 2000; Christiansen & Kirby, 
2003).  One reason seems to be the common assumption that  the only 
function of language is communication. As we have discussed in section 
2 the ‘received view’ holds that language is nothing but a very complex 
and powerful  communication system.  But  once one has acknowledged 
the importance of language in the development of human cognition one 
can no more assume that the evolution of language has been driven only 
by the pressures for better communication. On the contrary, an interesting 
question immediately rises: when did hominids started to use language 
for themselves as a cognitive tool?
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Generally,  there  is  a  tendency to  think that  language was used by 
humans  to  communicate  with  themselves  only  when  language  was 
already well developed and was sophisticated and syntactically complex; 
hence,  quite  recently  compared  with  the  first  appearance  of  a  proto-
language. However, this is not necessarily the case. Even a very simple 
proto-language,  for  example,  a  language made up of single  words  (or 
holophrases),  may be used to  talk  to  oneself,  with  advantages  for  the 
individual that uses the language in this way. Based on this hypothesis, 
we have developed another set of simulations in which we studied the 
effect of talking-to-oneself  for the evolution of a simple communication 
system (Mirolli & Parisi 2005a).
In  this  simulation  a  population  of  artificial  organisms  (whose 
behaviour  is  controlled by neural  networks)  evolve in  a  simple  world 
which  contains  both  other  organisms  and  poisonous  and  edible 
mushrooms.  Organisms  must  avoid  poisonous  mushrooms,  which 
decrease an individual’s  probability to reproduce,  and eat  edible ones, 
which  increase  individual  fitness.  Furthermore,  organisms  can 
communicate  to  each  other  the  quality  of  encountered mushrooms  by 
emitting  signals  through  their  linguistic  output  units.  But  in  order  to 
exploit the advantages provided by communication the population must 
evolve  an  appropriate  communication  system.  Since  each  individual 
mushroom is different from all other mushrooms belonging to the same 
category,  organisms  must  evolve  the  capacity  to  send  similar  signals 
every time they encounter an edible mushroom and another signal when 
they encounter poisonous mushrooms.
The evolution of such a communication system proves to be  quite 
difficult, especially because in this simulation there is no direct selective 
pressure  for  producing  the  appropriate  signals:  an  individual’s 
reproductive chances depend on the number and quality of mushrooms 
the individual eats, not on the signals it produces. Indeed, by producing 
good signals an individual can increase the probability of reproduction of 
another individual,  thus providing a direct  advantage for a competitor. 
The result is that in the standard simulation, in which signals are used 
only for social communication, a good and stable communication system 
never evolves. 
In  another  simulation  we let  organisms  use  signals  not  only  for 
sending signals to each other, but also for talking to themselves, as aids to 
memory. In particular, organisms can hear their self-produced signals and 
use  them  in  order  to  remember  the  information  received  by  other 
organisms. The results of this second simulation are clear: if organisms 
can use language not only as a social communication system but also as a 
cognitive (memory) aid the evolution of language itself is favoured, and 
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this  has  a  positive  impact  on the  organisms’  fitness  as  well.  In  other 
words,  organisms  which  can  talk  to  themselves  develop  a  better 
communication  system  and  reach  a  higher  fitness  with  respect  to 
organisms which can use signals only for communication. The reason is 
clear: in order to exploit the advantages provided by using language as a 
memory aid organisms must  produce useful signals, because otherwise 
they  would  mislead  themselves.  In  other  words,  talking  to  oneself 
associates  a  direct  individual  advantage  to  producing  useful  signals, 
which was not the case in the previous simulation. 
Using language as an aid to memory can be advantageous for at least 
two reasons: (a) delegating the memory function to the linguistic system 
can  leave  the  sensory-motor  system free  to  process  other  information 
useful  for  acting  in  the  environment  while  linguistically  remembering 
previous information, and (b) linguistic signals may occupy less space in 
memory than the sensory-motor information they refer to. 
Using  language  as  a  cognitive  tool  may  have  had  a  fundamental 
impact not only on categorization and memory. For example, other neural 
network simulations have shown that language can improve the learning 
of categories (Schyns,  1991;  Lupyan 2005). Furthermore,  the artificial 
life  simulations  of  Cangelosi  and  colleagues  (Cangelosi  and  Harnad 
2000; Cangelosi et al., 2000) have demonstrated that language can also 
allow ‘symbolic theft’, that is, a way of learning useful categories not by 
direct  sensory-motor  experience  with  the  world  but  through  cultural 
transmission mediated by language. And it can be argued that talking to 
oneself can be useful in many additional ways. It can allow an individual 
to direct her attention to specific aspects of the environment,  to make 
explicit predictions of future states of the environment, and to explicitly 
plan future actions (see Parisi and Mirolli 2006).
In as much as the advantages of talking to oneself do not require a 
complex  syntactic  language,  it  is  reasonable  that  the  discovery of  the 
cognitive uses of language could have happened quite early in language 
evolution,  in  particular  before  the  transition  from  an  holistic  proto-
language to the full-blown compositional language of modern humans. 
And this is just what the computational models reviewed here suggest: 
none  of  them  included  any  kind  of  syntax,  but  just  the  ‘symbolic’ 
capacity to associate ‘meanings’ (as internal representations of significant 
experiences) with linguistic labels. Nonetheless, they demonstrated that 
addressing to oneself even simple linguistic labels can provide important 
individual  advantages.  Trying  to  sort  out  what  could  have  been  the 
consequences of this early use of language for oneself in the subsequent 
evolution of language is an interesting topic for future research.
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5. Conclusion
A crucial, but often neglected, characteristic of human language is that 
language is  used not  only for  communicating with others but  also for 
communicating with oneself, whereas we seem not to have evidence for 
this type of use of animal communication systems. Talking to oneself, in 
the form of both private and inner speech, has tremendous consequences 
for  the development  of  the human mind.  Indeed,  we have argued that 
considering the cognitive role of language can provide the missing link 
for  addressing  the  high-level  cognitive  capacities  which  characterize 
humans within the new, emerging framework which considers cognition 
as  "environmentally  embedded,  corporeally  embodied,  and  neurally 
embrained." (van Gelder, 1999, pag. 244). In the present paper we have 
described some simple computer simulations that show that language can 
improve one’s categories and can be an useful aid to memory, both if it 
mediates  social  communication  and  if  it  is  used  to  talk  to  oneself  as 
private or inner speech. But we argue that the use of language for oneself 
does not improve only categorization and memory, but almost any human 
cognitive function. Therefore, much more work needs to be done in order 
to understand the relationships between language and cognition. And we 
think  that  computer  simulations  will  play  an  important  role  in  our 
understanding of this fundamental topic.
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